Captive portal
The captive portal technique forces an HTTP client on a network to see a special web page (usually for authentication purposes) before surfing the Internet normally. Captive portal turns a Web browser into a secure authentication device.[1] This is done by intercepting all packets, regardless of address or port, until the user opens a browser and tries to access the Internet. At that time the browser is redirected to a web page which may require authentication and/or payment, or simply display an acceptable use policy and require the user to agree. Captive portals are often employed at most Wi-Fi hotspots, and it can be used to control wired access (e.g. apartment houses, hotel rooms, business centers, "open" Ethernet jacks) as well.
Since the login page itself must be presented to the client, either that login page is locally stored in the gateway, or the web server hosting that page must be "whitelisted" via a walled garden to bypass the authentication process. Depending on the feature set of the gateway, multiple web servers can be whitelisted (say for iframes or links within the login page). In addition to whitelisting the URLs of web hosts, some gateways can whitelist TCP ports. The MAC address of attached clients can also be set to bypass the login process.
If an unauthenticated client requests a website, DNS is queried by the browser and the appropriate IP resolved as usual. The browser then sends an HTTP request to that IP address. This request, however, is intercepted by a firewall and forwarded to a redirect server. This redirect server responds with a regular HTTP response which contains HTTP status code 302 to redirect the client to the Captive Portal. To the client, this process is totally transparent. The client assumes that the website actually responded to the initial request and sent the redirect.
Client traffic can also be redirected using IP redirect on the layer 3 level. This not recommended as the content served to the client does not match the URL.
When a client requests a website, DNS is queried by the browser. The firewall will make sure that only the DNS provided by DHCP can be used by unauthenticated clients (or, alternatively, it will forward all DNS requests by unauthenticated clients to that DNS server). This DNS server will return the IP address of the Captive Portal as a result of all DNS lookups.
Some naive implementations don't block outgoing DNS requests by unauthenticated clients. Instead, the DHCP server uses as a DNS server a server that returns the IP address of the Captive Portal to unauthenticated clients. These implementations are very easy to bypass: a user simply needs to configure his computer to use an external DNS. This is why it is important to implement a firewall that ensures no inside clients can specify or use an outside DNS server.
Captive portals are gaining increasing use on free open wireless networks where instead of authenticating users, they often display a message from the provider along with the terms of use. Although the legal standing is still unclear (especially in the USA) common thinking is that by forcing users to click through a page that displays terms of use and explicitly releases the provider from any liability, any potential problems are mitigated. They also allow enforcement of payment structures.
Most of these implementations merely require users to pass an SSL encrypted login page, after which their IP and MAC address are allowed to pass through the gateway. This has been shown to be exploitable with a simple packet sniffer. Once the IP and MAC addresses of other connecting computers are found to be authenticated, any machine can spoof the MAC address and IP of the authenticated target, and be allowed a route through the gateway. For this reason some captive portal solutions created extended authentication mechanisms to limit the risk for usurpation.
Platforms that have Wi-Fi and a TCP/IP stack but do not have a web browser that supports HTTPS cannot use many captive portals. Such platforms include the Nintendo DS running a game that uses Nintendo Wi-Fi Connection. Non browser authentication is possible using WISPr, an XML-based authentication protocol for this purpose, or MAC-based authentication or authentications based on other protocols.
There also exists the option of the platform vendor entering into a service contract with the operator of a large number of captive portal hotspots to allow free or discounted access to the platform vendor's servers via the hotspot's walled garden, such as the deal between Nintendo and Wayport. For example, VoIP SIP ports could be allowed to bypass the gateway to allow phones to work.
See also:
Service Oriented Provisioning